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Abstract
We provide an example of a monopoly with Pigouvian second-degree price
discrimination where unit taxes are Pareto superior to ad valorem taxes.
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1. Introduction
The comparison of ad valorem and unit taxation is an old matter in public
economics. In competitive markets both taxation systems yield equal results,
but they become dissimilar in non-competitive scenarios. The superiority of ad
valorem taxes in monopoly settings was argued by Wicksell (1896) and proven
by Suits and Musgrave (1953). Skeath and Trandel (1994) strengthen this result
by showing that ad valorem taxes Pareto-dominate unit taxes, producing larger
profits, tax revenues and consumer surplus.
The literature agrees that this superiority holds under monopoly in general.
An example by Blackorby and Murty (2007) shows that, in a general equilibrium
model with a monopoly sector, and in extreme case –one hundred percent profit
taxation–, the ad valorem tax is not superior to the unit tax. Our example goes
a step further showing Pareto superiority of the unit tax over the ad valorem tax,
in a context of Pigouvian second-degree price discrimination. To the best of our
knowledge this is the first example to provide such an insight for a monopoly.
Such examples have been found already in some oligopoly models (see Anderson
et al. (2001)).
We use a monopoly with Pigouvian second-degree price discrimination2. Al-
though the modern view of second-degree price discrimination is focused on
nonlinear pricing, we stick to the original, simpler definition. Our result is in
∗Corresponding author
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2That is, the monopolist sets two different prices, such that all units with a demand price
greater than the highest price (p1) are sold at p1, while all units demanded at a price lower
than p1 but higher than p2 are sold at p2 (see Pigou (1921)).
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contrast with that of Cheung (1998), who generalizes the classical superiority
of ad valorem taxes over unit taxes for first, second, and third degree price
discrimination in a monopoly.
Pigouvian second-degree price discrimination is mainly of academic interest
because it assumes myopic customers. But sales and markdowns are common
events. And dynamic pricing has a long tradition in many industries, such as
airlines or hotels. However, they often require complex models. Elmaghraby and
Keskinocak (2003) provide several settings in which modeling customer behavior
as myopic can be appropriate. Here, we limit ourselves to the theoretical study
of Pigouvian price discrimination in a much simpler construct to illustrate a
new possible result.
2. The Model
This section proceeds as follows. First, we will consider the case of a
monopoly applying second price discrimination to a kinked demand. This type
of demand is well known in economic theory; see for example Sweezy (1939) and
Salop (1979). Secondly, we will investigate the effects of imposing a unit tax or
an ad valorem tax. Then, we proceed to see that, under these conditions, the
unit tax may be not only welfare superior but also Pareto superior to the ad
valorem tax. Finally, we will illustrate our model with a numerical example.
Consider a monopoly with constant marginal cost c that applies second price
discrimination. The firm faces a kinked linear demand such that:
p = max
{
min
{
a− bQ, r − sQ
}
, 0
}
,
with a, b, r, s > 0, and s > 4b.
The quantity at the bend is given by:
q =
r − a
s− b . (1)
In order to get a concave demand instead of a linear demand, we suppose that
q > 0 and rs <
a
b . For simplicity’s sake, we do not impose differentiability of the
function at point q.3
We will be concentrating on the cases where the monopolist’s optimal choice
is to select quantities in both segments of the demand. Let x denote the quantity
produced by the monopolist to satisfy the first segment of the demand, while
y represents the quantity sold at sale price. The monopolist will maximize its
profit function, given by:
Π = (a− bx)x+ (r − s(x+ y))y − c(x+ y).
So that the equilibrium quantities are:
x =
r − 2a
s− 4b +
c
s− 4b , and y =
as− 2br
s(s− 4b) +
c(2b− s)
s(s− 4b) . (2)
3Although this demand is not differentiable, our results do not depend substantially on
the differentiability of the function. The results would hold if the demand function was to be
substituted for the appropriate polynomial in the interval [q − , q + ].
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The overall quantity produced by the monopolist is:
x+ y =
rs− as− 2br
s(s− 4b) +
2bc
s(s− 4b) . (3)
Note that, in our example, we assume that s > 4b, so that total quantity
produced is increasing in c. But to simplify the analysis we will concentrate on
the simplest case, where c = 0.
Proposition 1. If c = 0, the solution presented in equation 2 holds if, and only
if, 3ss+2b ≤ ra ≤ s+2b3b .
Proof. The necessary and sufficient conditions for this are: (i) 0 ≤ x; (ii)
x ≤ q; (iii) q ≤ x+ y; and (iv) x+ y ≤ rs .
We know that a, b, r, s > 0; so s > 4b⇒ s > b. Simple calculations show the
following results:
(i) From equation 2, x ≥ 0⇔ r/a ≥ 2.
(ii) From equations 1 and 2, x ≤ q, is equivalent to ra ≤ s+2b3b .
(iii) From equations 1 and 3, x+ y ≥ q, can be expressed as ra ≥ 3ss+2b .
(iv) From equation 3, x+ y ≤ rs , can be transformed to ra ≤ s2b .
That is, when c = 0, the solution presented above holds if:
max
{
2,
3s
s+ 2b
}
≤ r
a
≤ min
{
s+ 2b
3b
,
s
2b
}
.
Since, if s > 4b, we have that 2 < 3ss+2b , and
s+2b
3b <
s
2b . The solution holds
if:
3s
s+ 2b
≤ r
a
≤ s+ 2b
3b
. (4)
Meaning that, for the purposes of our solution, (ii) and (iii) are the relevant
inequalities4.
After describing the solution for a monopoly with second price discrimina-
tion, we study how the introduction of a tax affects the results. We first consider
the introduction of an ad valorem tax, τ . As it is well known, after the tax is
put in place, the consumer will pay a price p, the firm will earn (1 − τ)p and
the government will collect τp. The perceived demand for the monopoly can be
rewritten by multiplying every parameter by (1− τ) as:
p = max
{
0, min
{
a(1− τ)− b(1− τ)Q, r(1− τ)− s(1− τ)Q
}}
.
Faced with this demand, the monopolist will produce (as can be seen in
equation 2 with c = 0):
xτ =
(1− τ)r − 2(1− τ)a
(1− τ)s− 4(1− τ)b = x, and yτ =
(1− τ)2as− 2(1− τ)2br
(1− τ)2s(s− 4b) = y.
4It is not difficult to find examples that meet the condition expressed by equation 4, and
one may serve at this point for clarification. Let b = 1, and s = 5, so that we get 15
7
< r
a
< 7
3
.
3
This result implies that, for any meaningful solution, the monopolist will
produce the same quantity with or without tax.
Let’s now consider a unit tax, t. Now, for every unit the consumer pays p,
the firm receives p− t and the government collects t. The perceived demand for
the monopolist becomes:
p = max
{
0, min
{
a− t− bQ, r − t− sQ
}}
.
According to equation 2, and maintaining the assumption of c = 0, a mo-
nopolist faced with this demand will produce
xt =
r − t− 2(a− t)
s− 4b , yt =
(a− t)s− 2b(r − t)
s(s− 4b)
xt + yt =
rs− as− 2br + 2bt
s(s− 4b) .
(5)
We can now see that, when a unit tax is imposed and under the assumption
s > 4b, a monopolist will increase both the output sold at the first (higher)
price and the total production for any meaningful solution, since:
∂xt
∂t
=
1
s(s− 4b) > 0, and
∂(xt + yt)
∂t
=
2b
s(s− 4b) > 0.
If the increase in production is too large, the solution may become mean-
ingless. We know, from Proposition 1 that a solution is meaningful whenever
equation 4 holds. For any r > a > t > 0 it is clear that r−ta−t ≥ ra . In con-
sequence, whenever r−ta−t ≤ s+2b3b , the solution is meaningful. Or, expressed
differently, whenever
t ≤ a(s+ 2b)− 3br
s− b = t1 (6)
We have come to the conclusion that the firm keeps production constant
with any ad valorem tax, but production is increased under unitary taxation.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A unit tax may be welfare superior to an ad valorem tax if the
monopolist engages in second degree price discrimination.
Let’s now compare how the government and the monopolist fare under both
tax regimes. With ad valorem taxes, consumers pay
Rτ = (a− bx)x+ (r − s(x+ y))y.
Substituting the quantities for their respective values from equations 2 and 3,
this becomes:
Rτ =
as(r − a)− br2
s(s− 4b) . (7)
Which in turn means that government revenue will be Gτ = τRτ , and the
monopolist’s profit is given by: Πτ = (1− τ)Rτ .
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With unit taxes, consumers pay
Rt = (a− bxt)xt + (r − s(xt + yt))yt.
Using equation 5, this becomes:
Rt =
as(r − a) + b(t2 − r2)
s(s− 4b) . (8)
We can conclude that, as long as the solution is economically meaningful,
consumers will pay more with a unit tax than with an ad valorem tax. For
this reason, for any value of τ , the additional income may be split between the
monopolist and the government so both are better off.
Let us now turn to the consumer surplus and prove that consumers will be
better off with a unit tax than with an ad valorem tax. Let V be the social
surplus associated to a production level of xτ + yτ = x + y. Since production
levels are increased under unitary taxation, social surplus will increase by an
amount given by (the area of a trapezoid),
∆V (t) =
∫ xt+yt
x+y
(r − sz)dz = (xt + yt − x− y)
(
r − sxt + yt + x+ y
2
)
.
From equations 3 and 5,
xt + yt − x− y = 2bt
s(s− 4b) , and
xt + yt + x+ y
2
=
rs+ bt− as− 2br
s(s− 4b) .
Consequently,
∆V (t) =
2bt(as− bt− 2br)
s(s− 4b)2 .
The consumer surplus associated to the ad valorem tax is given by V −Rτ ,
and by V + ∆V (t) − Rt if taxes are unitary. The difference between the two,
taking into account equations 7 and 8, is given by,
∆V (t)−Rt +Rτ = bt(2as− 4br − (s− 2b)t)
s(s− 4b)2 .
This means that consumer surplus will be greater under unitary taxation as
long as:
t ≤ 2as− 4br
s− 2b = t2. (9)
We will show that t2 > t1, as defined in equations 6 and 9. First it is clear
that, as s > 4b,
s− 2b
s− b = 1−
b
s− b > 1−
1
3
=
2
3
.
In consequence, we have
t2 − t1 > 2
3
2as− 4br
s− b −
a(s+ 2b)− 3br
s− b =
as+ br − 6ab
3(s− b) .
Proposition 1 and s > 4b, imply that r/a ≥ 2 > 6− s/b. Multiplying by ab, and
rearranging, yields as+ br − 6ab > 0, and then, t2 > t1.
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In consequence, with any meaningful solution (equation 6), consumer surplus
would be higher under unitary taxation than under ad valorem taxation.
To guarantee equivalent tax yield for both tax regimes, we need Gt = Gτ .
The highest unit tax compatible with our solution is t1. Let us call Gt1 to the
government income with t1. We define τ1 as
τ1 =
Gt1
Rτ
. (10)
Then for any τ ≤ τ1, we can find a unit tax t, such that t is Pareto superior
to τ . We can then conclude that5:
Proposition 3. A unit tax may be Pareto superior to an ad valorem tax if the
monopolist applies second degree price discrimination.
2.1. Numerical example
To illustrate the propositions above, we consider now a numerical example
with a demand function given by:
p = max
{
min
{
9−Q, 20− 5Q
}
, 0
}
So that, a = 9, b = 1, r = 20, and s = 5. The monopoly solution, when the
marginal cost is c = 0, would be q = 2.75 and p = 6.25, resulting in a total
income of 17.1875. However, monopoly profits would be higher under price
discrimination.
As we saw before, an ad valorem tax would not change the quantities pro-
duced, so from equation 2 we get that xτ = 2, yτ = 1. With the ad valorem
tax, τ , consumers pay a total of Rτ = 19, the government collects Gτ = 19τ ,
and the firm gets a profit of Πτ = 19(1− τ).
If a unitary tax was imposed instead, applying equation 5 we obtain xt =
2 + t, yt = 1 − 0.6t and xt + yt = 3 + 0.4t. From equation 6, we can deduce
that that maximum tax that may be imposed on the monopoly and still yield
a meaningful result would be t = 0.75. Under this regime, consumers pay
Rt = 19 + t
2/5, and, with any unitary tax of t ≤ 0.75, government income
would amount to Gt = 3t+ 0.4t
2. The ad valorem tax that would guarantee an
equivalent tax yield (according to equation 10) is τ1 = 0.13. Then for any ad
valorem tax lower than 13%, a Pareto superior unit tax can be found.
We use Figure 2.1 to illustrate graphically the numerical example provided
above. The figure on the right represents the situation of a monopoly with
second price discrimination and a unitary tax (t = 0.75), while the figure on
the left represents the alternative ad valorem tax (τ = 0.13). In both cases,
the areas shadowed in dark grey represent the profit accrued to the monopoly
under each tax regime, while the areas in light gray represent the revenue of the
government.
5We developed this result based on the assumption that c = 0. As c increases, as can be
seen in equation 3, the welfare advantage of unit taxes over ad valorem taxes decreases and
may be reversed for high enough values of c.
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Figure 1: Pigouvian second degree price discrimination in a monopoly with unitary and ad
valorem taxes
A tax of 13% may seem small, but other parameter values may result in
higher tax rates for which unit taxes are superior. For example, with a = 10,
b = 1, r = 25 and s = 10, we know from equation 6 that t1 = 5. Applying
equation 5, xt1 + yt1 =
11
6 . And from equation 7, Rτ =
175
12 . In consequence,
from equation 10 the unit tax is Pareto superior to the ad valorem tax up to
τ1 =
22
35 (that is, for any value of τ between 0 and 62.8%).
3. Conclusion
In this paper we present an example where the generally accepted superiority
of ad valorem taxes does not hold. We study a monopoly with Pigouvian second-
degree price discrimination and find that, under certain conditions, unit taxes
are not only welfare but also Pareto superior. This is not meant to be a general
result contradicting accepted wisdom, but a theoretical example suggesting that
the commonly held view deserves more careful consideration. In fact, it is
possible that this result may be extended to other settings. On the one hand,
the superiority of ad valorem taxes over unit taxes has long been established
to be greater in monopoly than in other market structures. Given the result
presented here for a monopoly, further investigation of the welfare effects of
taxes in different settings may be interesting. Similarly, other types of non-
Pigouvian second-degree price discrimination, such as nonlinear pricing, may
be worth investigating.
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